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Abstract: 
Many taxpayers truthfully declare their income to the tax administration. Why? In this paper 
we have found a significant correlation between tax morale and tax evasion, controlling a 
variety of factors. Furthermore we have analysed tax morale as dependent variable and 
studied the determinants that shape it. The results indicate that factors such as the tax 
administration, tax system, tax awareness, compliance perceptions, trust in officials and 
others, and the willingness to obey have a relatively strong impact on tax morale. 
 
JEL Classifications: H260 






I. INTRODUCTION  
 
 
Adams’ book (1993) starts with the inscription over the entrance to the 
Internal Revenue Service building: “Taxes are what we pay for a civilized 
society”. An essential question is to which extent individuals are willing to 
pay this price. The probability of being audited by the tax administration is 
rather low. Elffers (2000) points out that ”the gloomy picture of massive 
tax evasion is a phantom” (p. 185). A big share of revenues is collected 
without a draconian enforcement system. Co-operation in tax compliance 
experiments is higher than neoclassical models would predict. What are 
the reasons? Is tax compliance influenced by tax morale? What are the 
determinants that shape tax morale? The main purpose of this paper is to 
give answers to these important questions.  
To get empirical insights we are going to work with the Taxpayer 
Opinion Survey (TOS). In general, surveys give the opportunity to study a 
variety of factors, especially attitudes. It is even possible to integrate 
questions about taxpayers’ behaviour. On the other hand, we find many 
critical aspects, as, e.g., possibly biased samples that are not 
representative. Tax evasion is a sensitive area, and low response rates 
can create biases. Thus, a certain response rate is essential to get good 
data. The problem with delicate questions is to obtain honest answers. 
Jackson and Milliron (1986) point out that the technique used to solicit 
responses and the way questions are framed have an effect on the 
respondents’ answers. One way to deal with this problem is to conduct 
and to evaluate a variety of surveys to get a general picture of the main 
variables. An excellent method would be to conduct pan e l s  o r  t o  d o  
regular surveys in different countries, similar to the structure of the TOS 
In the last years, social researchers have intensively used surveys to 
investigate the causes and consequences of social capital or compliance 
behaviour. One reason might be that survey research uses more 
sophisticated statistical techniques and design compared to early years.   
 
 
II. TAX MORALE AND TAX EVASION 
 
Can we find a link between tax morale and tax evasion? Spicer and 
Lundstedt (1976) pointed out that the choice between tax compliance and 
evasion is not only made on the grounds of sanctions but also on the 
grounds of a set of attitudes and norms. According to Ajzen and Fishbein 
(1980) and Lewis (1982) behaviour can be predicted from attitudes and 
subjective norms. This might indicate that there is a connection between 
tax morale and tax compliance behaviour. The tax compliance literature 
has shown the relevance of going beyond a neoclassical approach when 
trying to understand why citizens pay taxes. Allingham and Sandmo’s 
(1972) groundbreaking model which assumes that the extent of tax 
evasion is negatively correlated with the probability of detection and the 
degree of punishment has been widely criticized (e.g., Graetz and Wilde, 
1985; Alm, McClelland, and Schulze, 1992). In many countries, the level 
of deterrence is too low to explain the high degree of tax compliance. To 
resolve this puzzle of tax compliance, many researchers have argued that 
tax morale can help explain the high degree of tax compliance (for an 
overview see Torgler, 2007). Lewis (1982) points out that “it could be that 
tax evasion is the only channel through which taxpayers can express their 
antipathy … we can be confident in our general prediction that if tax 
attitudes become worse, tax evasion will increase” (p. 165, 177). 
An increase in tax morale enhances the moral costs of behaving 
illegally and therefore reduces the incentives to evade taxes. It is a 
relevant issue to investigate whether differences in tax morale across 
countries are reflected in any differences in real, or observed, behaviours 
in these countries.  Torgler and Schneider (2007) extend the previous 
empirical models of the shadow economy by showing that tax morale 
matters quite significantly in the determination of the size of the shadow 
economy providing strong robustness tests using international and within 
country panel data. Frey and Schneider (2000) point out that moral costs  
 
 
could act as a disincentive to be active in the underground economy: “A 
good citizen has moral qualms to undertake a forbidden activity. These 
moral costs are closely related to ‘tax morale’ which motivates citizens to 
pay their dues to the state” (p. 6). 
Another possibility could be to compare the tax compliance results 
from experiments with a  post-experiment questionnaire that helps to get 
information about subjects’ attitudes (e.g., Bosco and Mittone 1997). The 
main disadvantage of such a method is that behaviour during the 
experiment might influence people’s answers to the questions. Thus, such 
questionnaires are not used in many experiments. Furthermore, in the 
case of tax compliance we can not be certain whether subjects make the 
same choices in the experiment as they would in the actual situations. On 
the other hand, researchers have done a great job in improving the 
realism of the experiments and tried to analyse cognitive processes that 
might be similar in reality (see Torgler 2002).  
Other researchers use scenarios involving actions taken by federal 
income tax return filers. People have to follow the scenarios and answer 
questions. Validated scales measure respondents’ ethical perceptions, 
moral intensity, and behavioural intentions (see, e.g., Hays 2000). 
Compared to experiments, the subject samples are normally higher, which 
makes the results more generalisable. On the other hand, it is difficult to 
isolate the effects of a variable in the way experiments can do.  
However, there is still a lack of empirical evidence on the link 
between attitudes and behaviour in the tax compliance literature. Why is 
this so important? The state and the tax administration have different 
possibilities to influence tax compliance. Traditional methods are 
deterrence factors as, fines, audits, and the variation of the tax rates. But 
tax compliance literature has shown the limitations of such instruments. 
Even researchers are not entirely sure about the effects of lowering tax 
rates. Graetz and Wilde (1985) point out that lowering tax rates is 
supported neither by theory nor by empirical evidence. Lower tax rates, 
for example, have also the effect of reducing the costs of underreporting.  
 
 
It seems that taxpayers are more compliant than traditional models would 
predict. Thus, knowledge about tax morale could lead to a better income 
tax policy.  
We are going to work with the Taxpayer Opinion Survey, collected in 
the United States in 1987 and providing a broad set of taxpayers’ opinions 
and evaluations of aspects as, the tax system, the Internal Revenue 
Service, tax evasion, cheating on taxes etc. The TOS offers the possibility 
to separately analyse two determinants of tax evasion, overstating of 
deduction or expenses and underreporting income, as dependent variable. 
From these considerations the following hypotheses can be derived: 
 
Hypothesis  1:    The lower tax morale, the more individuals 
overstate deductions or expenses. 




III. EMPIRICAL EVALUATION  
 
1.  Main Variables 
Surprisingly, the TOS has not been used by many researchers (see, e.g., 
Smith 1992, Sheffrin and Triest 1992). Even if the data set is relatively 
old, the huge amount of questions and the fact that not many papers have 
used the data set, makes it also attractive for newer research projects 
(see, e.g., Forest and Sheffrin 2002, using the 1990 TOS). Furthermore, 
after 1990, the TOS has not been conducted any more. The sample of 
2003 observations is reduced by the fact that taxpayers had sometimes 
the possibility to answer “not sure” or not to answer at all.  
Tax morale can be defined as the attitude towards tax evasion. The 
advantage of the TOS data set is that we find quite a few questions. We 
are going to use the following questions (scale from 1 to 6, where 6 
means not at all acceptable and 1 means perfectly acceptable):  
 
 
1.  Trading or exchanging goods or services with a friend or neighbour and 
not reporting it on your tax form (TM 1). 
2.  Reporting your main income fully, but not including some small outside 
income (TM 2). 
3.  Being paid in cash for a job and then not reporting it on your tax form 
(TM 3). 
4.  Not reporting some earnings from investments or interest that the 
government would not be able to find out about (TM 4). 
5.  Stretching medical deductions to include some expenses which are not 
really medical (TM 5). 
 
Furthermore, the following questions have been asked (6=strongly 
disagree, 1=strongly agree) 
6.  With what things cost these days, it’s okay to cut a few corners on your 
tax form just to help make ends meet (TM 6). 
7.  It’s not so wrong to hold back a little bit of taxes since the government 
spends too much anyway (TM 7). 
8.  The chances of getting caught are so low that it is worthwhile trying to 
cut corners a little on (TM 8). 
9.  When you’re not really sure whether or not you deserve a tax 
deduction, it makes sense to take a chance and take the deduction 
anyway (TM 9). 
10.It is not so wrong to underreport certain income since it does not really 
hurt anyone (TM 10). 
11.There is nothing wrong with interpreting the ambiguous or grey areas 
of the tax law to your own advantage (TM 11). 
 
The literature strongly uses the justifiability of evasion as proxy for tax 
morale (Torgler 2007). The advantage of these questions compared to 
other studies is a stronger realism due to concrete examples, focusing on 
the income reporting process and the over-deduction possibilities.  




1.  Within the past five years or so, do you think you might have 
overstated any deductions or expenses – like medical, charitable or 
business deductions, and so forth – even by just a small amount? 
Would you say you definitely have, probably have, probably have not, 
or definitely have not overstated any (OVERDEDUC)? (1. Definitely 
have not, 2. Probably have not, 3. Probably have, 4. Definitely have) 
 
2.  Within the past five years or so, do you think you might have left some 
reportable income off your federal tax return – even, just a minor 
amount (UNDERREP)? (1. Definitely have not, 2. Probably have not, 
3. Probably have, 4. Definitely have) 
 
 
There are pros and cons on using such tax evasion measurements. 
Looking at the empirical data, the advantage is that we hardly find data 
that tries to measure the extent of tax evasion in a survey. So, little 
empirical evidence is available. Lewis (1982) points out: ”But why not just 
ask respondents whether they evade tax or not? If they admit it, ask them 
how much this amounts to and perhaps even why they do it? What could 
be simpler? (…) Maybe it is worth a try. But some traditional wisdom (and 
a smattering of social psychology) recommends a tempering of 
enthusiasm” (p. 140). 
On the other hand, Lewis (1982) is aware of problems with such a 
procedure. People might refuse to answer or to take part in such a survey 
or moderate their views to reduce the possibility that information are used 
non-confidentially as, for example, to prosecute taxpayers. As a 
consequence, such an approach would generate a tendency to 
overestimate tax compliance. Lempert (1992) criticises the scale used in 
the TOS to catch over-deduction and under-declarations. Using terms such 
as ‘probably’ and ‘minor amount’ encourages individuals to state that tax 
evasion has been done. Finally, it is difficult to ask people about their 




2.  Estimation Results 
 
1.  Over-Deductions 
First a basic model with mostly demographic variables is estimated. We 
are going to estimate 11 equations with different tax morale variables. 
This helps check the sensitivity of the relationship between tax evasion 
and tax morale. Ordered probit equations are estimated to analyse the 
ranking information of the scaled dependent variables tax evasion/tax 
morale. In a second step additional variables are integrated into the 
analysis. Only one additional variable has been added to control the 
problems of missing values, as we have decided not to replace missing 
values with a sequence of regression estimates or with mean values. We 
used the weighting variable provided by Harris and Associates to get a 
representative population size.  
Table 1 presents the results using over-deduction as the dependent 
variable.  All  regressions estimation results are consistent with our 
hypothesis 1 that the lower tax morale, the more individuals overstate 
deductions or expenses. In all equations tax morale is significant at the 1 
percent significance level with a negative sign. To represent the 
quantitative effects of the variables, Table 2 indicates the marginal effect 
for the score 3 (probably overstated) and 4 (definitely overstated). The 
marginal effect indicates the change in the share of taxpayers (or the 
probability) belonging to a specific tax evasion level, when the 
independent variable increases by one unit. Only the marginal effects for 
the two highest tax evasion values are shown (in Table 2). As we can see, 
the marginal effect for score 3 is higher than for score 4. An increase in 
tax morale by one point reduces the share of persons indicating that they 
probably (definitely) have overstated deduction by around 2 (0.7) 
percentage points.  
Looking at the control variables we can see that females report a 
lower rate of tax evasion than males. However, the coefficient is not 
significant and the marginal effects are very small. On the other hand, a  
 
 
higher education has a positive effect on tax evasion. An increase in the 
education by one unit increases the share of persons indicating that they 
probably (definitely) have overstated deductions by around 1.4 (0.5) 
percentage points. Better educated taxpayers are supposed to know more 
about tax law and the possibilities to overstate deductions or expenses. 
Elderly people evade taxes significantly less than younger individuals. 
Furthermore, another reason might be, e.g., that estate taxes are likely to 
have smaller tax compliance disincentive effects on older people than on 
younger, as the tax burden has partly to be paid by the heirs. Tittle 
(1980) argues that older people are more sensitive to the threats of 
sanctions and over the years have acquired greater social stakes, as 
material goods and status, and depend on others’ reactions, so that the 
potential costs of sanction increase. They have lived for a certain time in 
the same place and thus are more attached to the community (see 
Pommerehne and Weck-Hannemann 1996). There is no significant 
difference between races. Married people evade taxes significantly more 
often than singles. Being married rather than single increases the share of 
persons indicating that they probably (definitely) have overstated 
deductions by around 4 (1.6) percentage points. This result is in line with 
some studies in the United States which found that noncompliance is more 
common and of greater magnitude among married taxpayers (see 
Clotfelter 1983, Feinstein 1991). One reason could be that in the U.S., 
dual incomes are treated as one, being thus taxed in a higher bracket 
than two separate incomes (Hays 2000). Similarly, a higher income leads 
to significantly higher tax evasion. An increase of the income increases the 
share of persons indicating that they probably (definitely) have overstated 
deduction. However, the marginal effects are quite low. Finally, there is no 
significant difference between the employment types, but the marginal 
effects indicate a higher tax evasion among part-time employees, 




The Effect of Tax Morale on Tax Evasion (Over-deduction) 
 
Notes: Dependent variable: tax evasion on a four point scale. In the reference group are MALE, WHITE, FULL TIME EMPLOYED, SINGLE. Significance levels: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01< p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
weighted ordered  probit  1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9     10     11    
Variable  Coeff.  z-Stat. Coeff.  z-Stat. Coeff.  z-Stat. Coeff.  z-Stat. Coeff.  z-Stat. Coeff.  z-Stat. Coeff.  z-Stat. Coeff.  z-Stat. Coeff.  z-Stat. Coeff.  z-Stat. Coeff.  z-Stat. 
a) Demographic Factors                                   
AGE  -0.012*** -3.479 -0.011***  -3.241 -0.010*** -2.911 -0.009*** -2.686 -0.011*** -3.304 -0.010***  -2.761 -0.009*** -2.693 -0.011*** -3.031 -0.010*** -2.945 -0.008**  -2.278 -0.008**  -2.222 
FEMALE  -0.022  -0.249  -0.004  -0.041  0.004  0.044 0.001  0.006 0.006  0.063 0.003  0.031 0.024  0.279 0.018  0.205 -0.011  -0.121  0.045  0.509 0.092  1.003 
EDUCATION  0.096***  4.669 0.093***  4.460 0.091***  4.407 0.102***  4.852 0.103***  4.930 0.103***  5.049 0.101***  5.035 0.089***  4.318 0.073***  3.523 0.099***  4.743 0.073***  3.362 
BLACK  0.124  0.779 0.023  0.150 0.028  0.181 0.027  0.172 0.023  0.148 -0.014  -0.093  -0.003  -0.022  0.006  0.036 0.016  0.099 -0.012  -0.080 0.079  0.509 
INDIAN,    ALASKAN  N.  -0.078  -0.153 -0.148  -0.309 -0.071  -0.136 -0.021  -0.039 -0.162  -0.300 -0.139  -0.270 -0.263  -0.515 -0.269  -0.580 -0.226  -0.415 -0.170  -0.341 -0.070  -0.137 
ASIAN  0.388  0.526 0.507  0.875 0.342  0.473 0.331  0.501 0.209  0.260 0.264  0.290 0.248  0.315 0.489  0.917 0.717  1.350 0.582  1.069 0.555 0.635 
b) Employment Status                                   
PART  TIME  EMPLOYED  0.208  1.200 0.277  1.625 0.224  1.306 0.177  1.053 0.201  1.148 0.229  1.365 0.261  1.465 0.186  1.000 0.138  0.801 0.105 0.587  0.057 0.305 
UNEMPLOYED  0.270  1.376 0.298  1.534 0.309  1.584 0.291  1.485 0.323* 1.674 0.256  1.293 0.339* 1.700 0.205  1.024 0.283  1.439 0.180  0.921 0.240  1.172 
RETIRED  0.106  0.764 0.106  0.771 0.078  0.568 0.036  0.261 0.099  0.718 0.077  0.554 0.066  0.479 0.079  0.562 0.048  0.342 0.032  0.234 0.034  0.228 
AT  HOME  -0.268  -0.953 -0.223  -0.801 -0.135  -0.541 -0.030  -0.124 -0.034  -0.132 -0.109  -0.460 -0.056  -0.225 -0.065  -0.276 -0.113  -0.414 -0.051  -0.210 -0.149  -0.533 
STUDENT  -0.161  -0.375 -0.123  -0.296 -0.180  -0.437 -0.134  -0.341 -0.119  -0.297 -0.213  -0.520 -0.217  -0.533 -0.144  -0.349 -0.213  -0.539 -0.187  -0.465 -0.228  -0.546 
c) Marital Status                                   
MARRIED  0.300**  2.549 0.329***  2.747 0.333***  2.803 0.362***  3.043 0.324***  2.764 0.294**  2.469 0.327***  2.614 0.285**  2.262 0.281**  2.421 0.291**  2.438 0.277**  2.269 
SEPARATED  0.382* 1.724 0.444**  2.035 0.431  1.972 0.437**  2.058 0.399* 1.898 0.358  1.624 0.409* 1.865 0.399* 1.742 0.285  1.279 0.300 1.329  0.334 1.490 
DIVORCED  0.247  1.546 0.257  1.628 0.213  1.351 0.255  1.594 0.307* 1.945 0.214  1.362 0.266  1.628 0.214  1.317 0.209  1.340 0.174  1.083 0.178  1.066 
WIDOWED  0.267  1.391 0.223  1.149 0.261  1.292 0.274  1.357 0.237  1.086 0.283  1.435 0.267  1.244 0.172  0.837 0.290  1.466 0.210  1.055 0.184  0.904 
d) Economic Variables                                   
INCOME  0.059***  3.419 0.063***  3.667 0.064***  3.631 0.055***  3.180 0.056***  3.268 0.061***  3.564 0.062***  3.666 0.057***  3.250 0.060***  3.480 0.061***  3.513 0.057***  3.179 
e) Tax Morale                                   
TM  1  -0.068*** -3.326                                
TM  2     -0.076***  -3.818                             
TM  3        -0.104*** -5.228                          
TM  4           -0.141*** -6.677                       
TM  5              -0.142*** -5.865                    
TM  6                 -0.142***  -5.830                 
TM  7                    -0.152*** -6.496              
TM  8                       -0.140*** -5.280           
TM  9                          -0.157*** -6.694        
TM10                             -0.158*** -5.801     
TM11                                -0.157***  -6.870 
Observations  1182   1200   1197   1184   1190   1205   1205   1183   1176   1196   1142   





Marginal Effects (Over-deduction) 
weighted ordered probit 1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9     10     11    
Variable  Marg. 3  Marg. 4  Marg. 3  Marg. 4  Marg. 3  Marg. 4  Marg. 3  Marg. 4  Marg. 3  Marg. 4  Marg. 3  Marg. 4  Marg. 3  Marg. 4  Marg. 3  Marg. 4  Marg. 3  Marg. 4  Marg. 3  Marg. 4  Marg. 3  Marg. 4 
a) Demographic Factors                                 
AGE  -0.002  -0.001 -0.002  -0.001 -0.001  -0.001 -0.001  -0.005 -0.002  -0.001 -0.001  -0.001 -0.001  -0.001 -0.002  -0.001 -0.001  -0.001 -0.001  0.000  -0.001  0.000 
FEMALE  -0.003  -0.001  -0.001  0.000 0.001  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.001  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.003  0.001 0.003  0.001 -0.002  -0.001  0.006  0.002 0.013  0.005 
EDUCATION  0.013  0.005 0.013  0.005 0.013  0.005 0.014  0.005 0.014  0.005 0.014  0.005 0.014  0.005 0.013  0.005 0.010  0.004 0.014  0.005 0.010  0.004 
BLACK  0.017  0.007 0.003  0.001 0.004  0.002 0.004  0.001 0.003  0.001 -0.002  -0.001  -0.001  0.000 0.001  0.000 0.002  0.001 -0.002  -0.001 0.011  0.004 
INDIAN,  ALASKAN   -0.011  -0.044 -0.020  -0.008 -0.099  -0.004 -0.003  -0.001 -0.023  -0.008 -0.019  -0.007 -0.036  -0.014 -0.038  -0.015 -0.031  -0.012 -0.024  -0.009 -0.010  -0.004 
ASIAN  0.053  0.022 0.070  0.028 0.047  0.018 0.046  0.017 0.029  0.010 0.036  0.014 0.034  0.013 0.069  0.027 0.098  0.038 0.081  0.031 0.077 0.029 
b) Employment Status                                   
PART  TIME  EMPL.  0.028  0.012 0.038  0.016 0.031  0.012 0.025  0.009 0.028  0.010 0.031  0.012 0.034  0.013 0.026  0.010 0.019  0.007 0.015 0.006  0.008 0.003 
UNEMPLOYED  0.037  0.015 0.041  0.017 0.043  0.016 0.040  0.015 0.045  0.016 0.035  0.014 0.036  0.014 0.029  0.011 0.039  0.015 0.025  0.010 0.033  0.013 
RETIRED  0.015  0.006 0.015  0.006 0.011  0.004 0.005  0.002 0.014  0.005 0.011  0.004 0.047  0.018 0.011  0.004 0.007  0.003 0.005  0.002 0.005  0.002 
AT  HOME  -0.037  -0.015 -0.031  -0.013 -0.019  -0.007 -0.004  -0.002 -0.005  -0.002 -0.015  -0.006 -0.008  -0.003 -0.009  -0.004 -0.015  -0.006 -0.007  -0.003 -0.021  -0.008 
STUDENT  -0.022  -0.009 -0.017  -0.007 -0.025  -0.010 -0.019  -0.007 -0.017  -0.002 -0.029  -0.011 -0.030  -0.011 -0.020  -0.008 -0.029  -0.011 -0.026  -0.010 -0.032  -0.012 
c) Marital Status                                   
MARRIED  0.041  0.017 0.045  0.018 0.046  0.018 0.050  0.019 0.045  0.016 0.040  0.016 0.045  0.017 0.040  0.016 0.038  0.015 0.040  0.016 0.038  0.015 
SEPARATED  0.052  0.022 0.061  0.025 0.060  0.023 0.061  0.023 0.056  0.020 0.049  0.019 0.056  0.022 0.056  0.022 0.039  0.015 0.042  0.016 0.046  0.018 
DIVORCED  0.034  0.014 0.035  0.014 0.030  0.011 0.035  0.013 0.043  0.015 0.029  0.011 0.037  0.014 0.030  0.012 0.029  0.011 0.024  0.009 0.025  0.009 
WIDOWED  0.037  0.015 0.031  0.013 0.036  0.014 0.038  0.014 0.033  0.012 0.038  0.015 0.037  0.014 0.024  0.010 0.040  0.015 0.029  0.011 0.026  0.010 
d) Economic Variables                                   
INCOME  0.008  0.003 0.009  0.004 0.088  0.003 0.008  0.003 0.008  0.003 0.008  0.003 0.009  0.003 0.008  0.003 0.008  0.003 0.009  0.003 0.008 0.003 
e) Tax Morale                                   
TM  1  -0.009  -0.004                                
TM  2     -0.010  -0.004                             
TM  3        -0.014  -0.006                        
TM  4           -0.020  -0.007                       
TM  5              -0.020  -0.007                    
TM  6                 -0.019  -0.008                 
TM  7                    -0.021  -0.008              
TM  8                       -0.020  -0.008           
TM  9                          -0.021  -0.008        
TM10                             -0.022  -0.009     





In the next step we are going to analyse under-reporting as dependent 
variable, using the same control variables.  Table 3 presents the findings. 
Similar to Table 1, all regression estimation results are consistent with 
hypothesis 2 that the lower tax morale, the more individuals under-report 
their income. In all equations tax morale is highly significant. In Table 4 
we are going to present the marginal effects of the robust significant 
coefficients. We can see that the tax morale marginal effects are greater 
compared to the equations using over-deduction as dependent variable, 
especially for the extreme value “definitely done under-declaration”.  
An increase in tax morale by one point reduces the share of persons 
indicating that they probably (definitely) have under-declared their income 
between 1.2 and 2.6 (0.8 and 1.6) percentage points. Contrary to the 
findings above, females report a significantly  lower tax evasion than 
males. Being female rather than male reduces the probability of a person 
stating that under-declaration has probably (definitely) been done by 
more than 4 (2.4) percentage points. On the other hand, a higher 
education has again a positive effect on tax evasion. An increase in the 
education by one unit increases the share of persons indicating that they 
probably (definitely) have under-reported income by around 1.0 (0.6) 
percentage points. The coefficient of the variable married has lost its 
significance. Other variables are in line with Table 1 and have not a 
significant impact on tax evasion.  
In general the results indicate that there is a statistically significant 
correlation between tax morale and tax evasion, identifying 11 proxies of 
tax morale and distinguishing between over-deductions and under-
declaration. In all 22 equations the coefficients are highly significant. 







The Effect of Tax Morale on Tax Evasion (Under-declaration) 
 
weighted ordered probit  1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9     10     11    
Variable  Coeff.  z-Stat. Coeff.  z-Stat. Coeff.  z-Stat. Coeff.  z-Stat. Coeff.  z-Stat. Coeff.  z-Stat. Coeff.  z-Stat. Coeff.  z-Stat. Coeff.  z-Stat. Coeff.  z-Stat. Coeff.  z-Stat. 
a) Demographic Factors                                   
AGE  -0.014*** -4.093 -0.013***  -3.894 -0.011*** -3.421 -0.012*** -3.553 -0.014*** -4.273 -0.013***  -3.810 -0.012*** -3.737 -0.013*** -3.913 -0.015*** -4.004 -0.010*** -2.898 -0.012***  -3.570 
FEMALE  -0.320*** -4.034 -0.276***  -3.513 -0.298*** -3.728 -0.307*** -3.902 -0.308*** -3.906 -0.300***  -3.786 -0.273*** -3.442 -0.282*** -3.543 -0.330  -4.065 -0.263*** -3.306 -0.267***  -3.211 
EDUCATION  0.068***  3.111 0.067***  3.087 0.073***  3.353 0.077***  3.556 0.071***  3.246 0.077***  3.602 0.078***  3.622 0.064***  3.025 0.064  2.880 0.074***  3.428 0.043* 1.897 
BLACK  0.001  0.008  -0.075  -0.542 -0.070  -0.502 -0.084  -0.614 -0.047  -0.333 -0.108  -0.757 -0.077  -0.546 -0.091  -0.655 -0.037  -0.263 -0.088  -0.662 -0.088  -0.619 
INDIAN,  ALASKAN  N.  -0.633  -1.009 -0.790  -1.326 -0.647  -0.978 -0.621  -0.987 -0.767  -1.179 -0.707  -1.226 -0.792  -1.466 -0.756  -1.500 -0.712  -1.230 -0.792  -1.269 -0.765  -1.209 
ASIAN  -0.096  -0.149 0.364  1.223  -0.163  -0.243 -0.106  -0.174 -0.253  -0.367 -0.230  -0.312 -0.254  -0.364 0.302  0.983  0.502  1.639  0.350 1.193  -0.084  -0.109 
b) Employment Status                                   
PART  TIME  EMPLOYED  0.300* 1.874 0.281* 1.728 0.243  1.394 0.183  1.061 0.236  1.435 0.213  1.274 0.171  1.035 0.204  1.241 0.130  0.754 0.007  0.041 0.147  0.861 
UNEMPLOYED  -0.015  -0.073  0.062  0.306 0.144  0.708 0.109  0.523 0.128  0.602 0.047  0.233 0.138  0.656 0.078  0.367 0.139  0.670 0.022  0.099 0.075  0.352 
RETIRED  0.025  0.206 0.082  0.699 0.053  0.440 0.013  0.108 0.040  0.338 0.025  0.210 0.062  0.517 0.043  0.357 0.079  0.603 -0.008  -0.065 -0.018  -0.141 
AT  HOME  -0.213  -0.856 -0.131  -0.536 -0.016  -0.082 0.009  0.043  -0.044  -0.204 -0.071  -0.337 0.000  0.000  -0.074  -0.343 0.026  0.115 -0.001  -0.007  -0.163  -0.641 
STUDENT  0.293  0.894 0.369  1.171 0.313  0.992 0.345  1.069 0.342  1.045 0.257  0.750 0.266  0.762 0.314  0.923 0.290  0.919 0.272  0.778 0.241  0.735 
c) Marital Status                                   
MARRIED  0.092  0.785 0.110  0.921 0.129  1.088 0.129  1.081 0.128  1.100 0.086  0.736 0.112  0.958 0.072  0.623 0.104  0.895 0.092  0.786 0.082  0.695 
SEPARATED  -0.082  -0.340 -0.057  -0.250 -0.057  -0.257 -0.077  -0.327 -0.035  -0.152 -0.076  -0.330 -0.040  -0.167 -0.085  -0.341 -0.093  -0.382 -0.163  -0.694 -0.206  -0.817 
DIVORCED  0.179  1.170 0.161  1.058 0.173  1.129 0.174  1.135 0.235  1.555 0.158  1.042 0.212  1.396 0.147  0.983 0.167  1.087 0.139  0.932 0.142  0.912 
WIDOWED  -0.156  -0.688 -0.167  -0.729 -0.081  -0.364 -0.104  -0.470 -0.053  -0.237 -0.093  -0.415 -0.154  -0.665 -0.158  -0.707 -0.143  -0.584 -0.237  -1.023 -0.165  -0.720 
d) Economic Variables                                   
INCOME  -0.024  -1.353 -0.016  -0.922 -0.020  -1.079 -0.027  -1.516 -0.023  -1.267 -0.022  -1.240 -0.023  -1.271 -0.025  -1.368 -0.025  -1.313 -0.025  -1.378 -0.036* -1.942 
e) Tax Morale                                   
TM  1  -0.101*** -5.149                                
TM  2     -0.122***  -6.530                             
TM  3        -0.146*** -7.636                          
TM  4           -0.125*** -5.917                       
TM  5              -0.100*** -4.310                    
TM  6                 -0.127***  -5.481                 
TM  7                    -0.143*** -6.159              
TM  8                       -0.103*** -3.889           
TM  9                          -0.085*** -3.801        
TM10                             -0.174*** -7.103     
TM11                                -0.140***  -6.491 
Observations  1235     1254     1254     1238     1245     1262     1263     1237     1226     1250     1200   
Prob(F-statistic)  0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000    






Marginal Effects (Under-declaration) 
 
weighted ordered probit  1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9     10     11    
Variable  Marg. 3  Marg. 4  Marg. 3  Marg. 4  Marg. 3  Marg. 4  Marg. 3  Marg. 4  Marg. 3  Marg. 4  Marg. 3  Marg. 4  Marg. 3  Marg. 4  Marg. 3  Marg. 4  Marg. 3  Marg. 4  Marg. 3  Marg. 4  Marg. 3  Marg. 4 
a) Demographic Factors                        
AGE  -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.026 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
FEMALE  -0.047 -0.031 -0.040 -0.026 -0.044 -0.027 -0.046 -0.029 -0.046 -0.030 -0.044 -0.028 -0.040 -0.026 -0.042 -0.028 -0.048 -0.032 -0.039 -0.024 -0.040 -0.025 
EDUCATION  0.010 0.007 0.010 0.006 0.011 0.007 0.012 0.007 0.010 0.007 0.011 0.007 0.011 0.007 0.010 0.006 0.009 0.006 0.011 0.007 0.006 0.004 
R A C E   ( i n c l u d e d )                         
                        
b) Employment Status                        
( i n c l u d e d )                         
                        
c) Marital Status                        
( i n c l u d e d )                         
                        
d) Economic Variables                        
( i n c l u d e d )                         
                        
e) Tax Morale                        
TM  1  -0.015  -0.010                      
TM  2    -0.018  -0.012                    
TM  3      -0.022  -0.013                  
TM  4        -0.019  -0.012                
TM  5          -0.015  -0.010              
TM  6            -0.019  -0.012            
TM  7              -0.021  -0.013          
TM  8                -0.015  -0.010        
TM  9                  -0.012  -0.008      
TM10                    -0.026  -0.016    
TM11                                                              -0.0209  -0.013  
 
 
3. Tax Morale 
Having found a significant correlation between tax morale and tax evasion 
we are going to analyse tax morale as dependent variable, thus analysing 
the factors that shape tax morale. Although many researchers have 
pointed out that tax morale influences tax compliance rates, we hardly 
find any empirical evidence that specifies which characteristics shape tax 
morale. To use weighted ordered probit models and for simplicity we are 
going to specify tax morale as dependent variable with the following 
question:  Trading or exchanging goods or services with a friend or 
neighbour and not reporting it on your tax form (scale 1 to 6, where 6 
means not at all acceptable and 1 means perfectly acceptable). We 
believe that this question compared to others catches tax morale pretty 
well as it integrates friends’ and neighbours’ services which are almost 
impossible for a tax administration to control
1. As we have some missing 
values for each factor, we decided to analyse each determinant 
separately, based on the same control variables used in Table 1 and 3. 
The following factors are analysed: 
  
•  Tax authority 
•  Tax system  
•  Perception and experiences with deterrence factors and tax 
evasion 
•  Awareness of tax issues 
•  Trust in government, social capital and obedience 
 
1. Tax Authority 
Taxpayers’ estimation of the tax authority might have an effect on tax 
morale. It depends on how they are treated by the administration. As 
Smith (1992) argues, “cycles of antagonism between the tax 
administration and the taxpayer might begin to break with a positive 
concession by the administrator” (p. 226). He points out that a respectful 
                                                      
1 However, it should be noticed that in many countries this question is the grey zone and often not 
taxed.   
 
 
and fair treatment of taxpayers induces respect for the tax system and 
thus leads to co-operation. Feld and Frey (2002a) see the relationship 
between these two actors as a psychological contract: 
 
“Tax authorities must acknowledge and support the contract with the 
taxpayers by acting in a respectful way towards them, but also by 
preventing honest taxpayers from being exploited in the process” (p. 4). 
 
Using a data set of tax authorities’ behaviour in Switzerland (26 cantonal 
tax authorities), they find that tax authorities of cantons with more direct 
participation rights treat taxpayers more respectfully and are less 
suspicious if taxpayers report too low incomes than the authorities in 
cantons with less direct democracy. On the other hand, not submitted tax 
declarations are more heavily fined. In a recent paper, Feld and Frey 
(2002b) continue on this framework and argue that tax morale is 
supported or even raised when tax officials treat taxpayers with respect 
and on the other hand is reduced when the administration considers 
taxpayers as individuals who have to be forced  to pay the taxes: “The 
feeling of being controlled in a negative way, and being suspected of tax 
cheating, tends to crowd out the intrinsic motivation to act as an 
honorable taxpayers and, as a consequence, tax morale will fall. In 
contrast, if the tax official makes an effort to find out the reason for the 
error by contacting the taxpayer in an informal way, the taxpayer will 
appreciate this respectful treatment and tax morale will be upheld” (p. 4). 
They divide respectful treatment, by the tax administration into two 
components (p. 5): (i) transparent and clear procedure, (ii) respecting 
taxpayers’ character. Their empirical analysis shows that treating 
taxpayers respectfully reduces tax evasion.  
  With the same data used by Smith (1992) we expand the analysis, 
focusing on tax morale and using more variables to catch attitudes 




1.  JOB OF THE IRS (Internal Revenue Service). The respondents were 
asked to rate the job that IRS does (excellent=4, pretty good=3, 
only fair=2, poor=1) regarding: 
-  processing returns 
-  issuing refunds 
-  answering questions 
-  auditing returns 
-  collecting taxes due 
Cronbach’s α for the items is 0.74, giving the possibility to put them 
as one index (average of the items).  
 
2.  HONESTY AND FAIRNESS. The respondents were asked to agree or 
disagree with eight statements about the IRS (Cronbach’s α = 
0.83). 
-  The IRS employees are honest – you could never bribe them 
(6=strongly agree, 1=strongly disagree) 
-  IRS employees are just as knowledgeable as any private tax 
expert 
-  I am confident that the IRS would never try to take more money 
from me than they should 
-  You can depend on the IRS to keep accurate tax records 
-  That the IRS automatically withholds some of my income and 
even get copies of my W-2 forms and interest statements 
sometimes makes me feel they are always nearby and watching 
-  When it comes to investigating their own people, the IRS is as 
thorough as they are with everyone else 
-  IRS employees have an unusual amount of honesty and integrity  
-  IRS procedures and practices are fair and reasonable ones that 
respect the rights of taxpayers 
 
3.  HELP AND INFORMATION. The respondents were asked to place the 
IRS on a scale from 1 to 6 based on the following subjects: 
-  Information easy to understand (value 6), information difficult to 
understand (value 1)  
 
 
-  IRS employees extremely knowledgeable (6), not at all 
knowledgeable (1) 
-  Very easy to find right person to talk to (6), impossible to find 
right person to talk to (1) 
-  Consistent from one IRS employee to another (6), different IRS 
employees give you different answers (1) 
-  Got the information (6), took forever to get the information from 
the IRS (1) 
-  Employees very willing to help (6), employees not at all willing to 
help (1) 
-  Employees willing to act in taxpayer’s best interest (6), 
employees always act in government’s best interest (1) 
-  Overall, employees highly professional (6), overall, employees 
very unprofessional (1) 
Cronbach’s α for the addition of the eight items is 0.91, indicating a 
high correlation between the items and thus offering the possibility 
to take them as one index. 
 
Table 5 presents the results. In general, all three variables have a highly 
significant positive effect on tax morale. An increase in the index of how 
good the IRS works by one point raises the share of persons indicating the 
highest tax morale by 2 percentage points; for the honesty and fairness of 
the IRS and the provision of help and information, the proportion of 
persons indicating the highest tax morale increases by 1.4 percentage 
points.  
 
2. Fairness of the Tax System  
A tax system must be fair in the view of the taxpayers. If a taxpayer feels 
that she/he is in a sort of unfair contract she/he will probably be less likely 
to comply. Taxpayers are more inclined to comply to the law if the 
exchange between the paid tax and the performed government services 
are found to be equitable. A number of survey research studies have 
reported a positive correlation between perceptions of fiscal inequity and  
 
 
tax evasion (Spicer 1974, Song and Yarbrough 1978). We are going to use 
the following variables to consider the perceived fairness of the tax 
system: 
 
1.  How do you feel about the federal income tax system as it applies to 
the 1986 tax return – do you feel it is quite fair to most people (4), or 
reasonably fair (3), or somewhat unfair (2), or quite unfair to most 
people? (1) (first tax fairness variable).  
 
2.  The present tax system benefits the rich and is unfair to the ordinary 
working man or woman (1= strongly agree, 6= strongly disagree) 
(second tax fairness variable). 
 
Table 5 presents the results of the estimations. We find that tax 
fairness has a significant positive effect on tax morale. An increase in the 
perception scale of tax fairness by one unit raises the share of persons 
indicating the highest tax morale by 3 for tax fairness 1 and 2.4 
percentage points for tax fairness 2.  
 
3. Tax Complexity  
Complexity may result in unintentional non-compliance if taxpayers have 
problems filing the tax form. Furthermore, complexity can reduce the 
moral costs of evading taxes. Such noncompliance differs from other 
crimes, because it can be argued that unintentional errors have been 
made due to misinterpretation of the rules. Honest persons will have 
higher filling costs and thus higher compliance costs. On the other hand, 
individuals who want to reduce these costs may either fail to take 
legitimate credits or may even claim credits without ascertaining 
eligibility. Krause (2000) states that when rules are complex, compliance 
and enforcement will be imperfect. Costs are imposed on the taxpayers 
and the tax administration, undermining the effectiveness of the tax 
policies. Tax examiners in the tax administration will have greater 
problems to identify a case of noncompliance and to discern whether the  
 
 
violation was deliberate or unintentional (Erard 1997). This can increase 
tax collection costs. Furthermore, complicated tax laws are subject to a 
broad variety of interpretations (Krause 2000). However, other studies 
have failed to document a negative relation between complexity and 
compliance (e.g., Yankelovich and Skelly 1984).  
Complexity may affect taxpayers’ perceptions of the equity of the 
tax system. It can be argued that tax complexity and equity are positively 
related. A more complex tax law can help determine taxpayers’ ability to 
pay and could stop those who would be able to exploit tax rules. On the 
other hand, additional compliance and administration costs incur (see 
Kaplow 1996) and taxpayers could be frustrated. A simpler tax law would 
reduce taxpayers’ expenditure in time and money to comply with the tax 
law (see Blumenthal and Slemrod 1992). Increasing tax complexity may 
move taxpayers’ trade-off between costly compliance either by using own 
effort or external help (tax practitioners) and evading taxes towards the 
“exit” decision. Smith (1992) found that complexity significantly reduces 
the perceived IRS procedural fairness. On the other hand, Forest and 
Sheffrin (2002) did not find a systematic link between perception of 
complexity and perception of unfairness, using data from the 1990 TOS 
with similar questions. Contrary to Smith (1992) we only took one item to 
measure the complexity of the tax system: 
 
Thinking about how easy or difficult it is to fill out your tax form, how 
complicated do you think our federal income tax laws and rules are for 
your particular income situation (1= not at all complicated/very easy to 
understand, 6 = extremely complicated/very difficult to understand).  
 
Table 5 presents the results. We can see that complexity has the tendency 
to reduce tax morale. However, the marginal effects are small and the 






4. Perception regarding Tax Evasion 
The intensity of moral constraints might depend on how widespread 
evasion behaviour is in a group. The social constraint might be very small 
if individuals are aware that they are part of  a minority who pays taxes. 
People who used to pay taxes might get angry, which reduces the moral 
costs of evasion and increases the incentive to engage in tax evasion. 
Individuals could react emotionally and very strongly to such perceived 
attitudes. If a taxpayer believes that tax evasion is common and notices 
that many individuals evade taxes, this could crowd out intrinsic 
motivation to comply with taxes. Evasion is a signal that intrinsic 
motivation is not recognised. Thus, taxpayers get the feeling that they can 
as well be opportunistic. Lewis (1982, p. 144) argues for the possible 
existence of a “tax subculture, with its own set of unwritten rules and 
regulations. Thus I am more likely to evade not only because I have 
friends who, I know, have got away with it (so why shouldn’t I?) but also 
because evasion is ethically acceptable among my friends … Furthermore, 
‘no friends of mine can be criminals’ …‘What’s good enough for fine, 
upstanding citizens like Fred Bloggs, John Doe, Donald Campbell, Herman 
Schmitt and Hans Anderson is good enough for me’”. Frey and Torgler 
(2007) find using data for Western and Eastern European countries that 
taxpayers are strongly influenced by their perceptions of the behaviour of 
other taxpayers. If taxpayers believe tax evasion to be common, tax 
morale decreases. Alternatively, if they believe others to be honest, tax 
morale increases. We would hypothesise that the higher the percentage of 
taxpayers someone perceives to cheat on taxes, the lower his/her tax 
morale will be. The TOS  has asked the respondents the following 
question: 
 
As you may know, an audit is when you have to go to an IRS office or they 
come to your house or business or they may correspond with you, and you 
are asked to prove your deductions or answer questions about your tax  
 
 
return. The question I have is: out of every 100 taxpayers at your income 
level, how many or what percent do you think were audited last year.  
 
Table 5 indicates that this hypothesis cannot be rejected. The findings 
indicated that there might be a crowding out effect of tax morale.  
4. Awareness of Tax Issues 
It might be interesting to analyse to which extent the awareness of tax 
issues has an impact on tax morale. Information acquirement and 
discussion depend on individuals’ incentives. Gaining information and 
discussing this topic with other people imposes time costs on taxpayers. 
In a discussion people have the opportunity to exchange arguments 
which raises the level of information of the participants. It also enhances 
the incentive to participate and to incur additional information costs. 
People interact in a face-to-face situation and are able to identify the 
others’ preferences. It could be argued that dissatisfaction with 
government or generally negative attitude towards the tax system might 
increase the incentives to talk to individuals to get a better idea about the 
opportunities to evade and the probability of getting caught.  
  A low awareness is linked with a higher uncertainty regarding the 
IRS process. Scholz and Pinney (1995) argue that the uncertainty about 
the probability of getting caught imposes sufficient difficulties for citizens 
to make them rely on heuristics to behave honestly. Tax compliance 
experiments have analysed the role of fiscal uncertainty by comparing the 
compliance behaviour when key fiscal parameters are known with 
certainty to the behaviour when these parameters are made uncertain. 
Alm, Jackson and McKee (1992) found in an experiment that introducing 
uncertainty in the fiscal parameters, the fine rate and the probability of 
detection increases tax compliance. Thus, better information and 
awareness of the IRS activities might have a negative effect on tax 
morale. 





  Do you ever talk about IRS and its activities with your family? (TALK 
WITH FAMILY) 
Do you ever talk about IRS and its activities with your friends and co-
workers? (TALK WITH FRIENDS) 
How much attention did you pay to discussions on the radio about IRS 
and its activities (a lot, quite a bit, some, very little, or no attention)? 
(RADIO INFORMATION) 
 
Table 5 presents the results. People with a higher awareness of IRS 
issues tendentially have a lower tax morale. Talking with friends rather 
than with the family has a stronger negative effect on tax morale. One 
reason might be that talking inside a family about all different kinds of 
topics and thus also IRS issues is common practice, but it is not at all 
common to discuss such a sensitive topic with friends. Thus, someone 
who discusses IRS issues with friends does so with specific intentions. 
The coefficient for the effects of RADIO INFORMATION is not significant. A 
radio is a medium that in general informs about different topics, and 
there is a low probability that it informs regularly about the IRS. Sensitive 
and specific topics are rather treated in a discussion among people than 
on the radio. We have also estimated equations looking at other media 
like TV and newspaper. The results are in line, not showing a significant 
effect on tax morale.  
 
5. Trust and Obedience 
 
5.1  Trust in Public Officials 
In the last equations the relevance of trust and obedience to tax morale 
are analysed. In the tax compliance literature economists have recently 
started to pay attention to the determinant of trust (Slemrod 2002, Torgler 
2007). However, the concept of trust is not new. John Locke has already 
pointed out the relevance of trust in the interaction between citizens and 
the government. Trust in public officials might tend to increase taxpayers’  
 
 
positive attitudes and commitment to the tax system and tax-payment, 
which has finally a positive effect on tax compliance.  
Taxes can be seen as a price paid for government’s positive actions. 
Thus, if taxpayers trust the public officials, they are more willing to be 
honest. If the government acts trustworthily, taxpayers might be more 
willing to comply with the taxes. Similar to the tax administration, the 
relationship between taxpayers and government can be seen as a relational 
contract or psychological contract, which involves strong emotional ties and 
loyalties. Such a psychological tax contract can be maintained by positive 
actions, based on trust.  
The variable has been developed from the following question:  
 
Public officials can usually be trusted to do what’s right (strongly agree=4, 
mildly agree=3, mildly disagree=2, strongly disagree=1).  
 
The results are in line with our hypothesis that there is a significantly 
positive correlation between trust in officials and tax morale. An increase in 
the trust scale by one unit increases the share of subjects indicating the 
highest tax morale by 3.5 percentage points.  
 
5.2  Trust in other People 
The TOS measures trust in a general way, asking respondents if they trust 
other people. Paldam and Svendsen (2000) point out that this might be the 
best available measure of social capital. Slemrod (1998) stresses that ”in 
high-trust societies, individuals need to spend less to protect themselves from 
being exploited in economic transactions” (p. 29). 
Thus, a high level of social capital facilitates a high level of 
government. People who trust each other are in a closer interaction, which 
might produce a positive attitude towards contributing to the public good 
and paying the taxes. The results in Table 5 indicate that higher social 
capital leads to a significantly higher tax morale. An increase in the scale of  
 
 
trust by one unit increases the share of subjects indicating the highest tax 
morale by 2 percentage points.  
 
5.3 Obedience 
Rule obedience can be defined as the disposition of the members of a 
society to follow certain rules. Obligation can be seen as a sort of internal 
institution. People have learnt the rules by education and experience to a 
degree where they have developed an obligation to fulfil. The rules are 
obeyed spontaneously without resourceful reflections. Taxpayers have 
turned the rules into personal preferences and apply them consistently 
(for an analysis of internal rules see Kasper and Streit 1999). Lindenberg 
(2001) explains obligation-based behaviour from a framing point of view 
as the goal to act appropriately, which is acquired through socialisation.  
 
Table 5: Determinants of Tax Morale 
Key Independent Variables  Coeff. z-Stat.  Marg.   
Tax Administration      
JOB OF THE IRS  0.078***  3.850  0.02 
HONESTY AND FAIRNESS  0.055**  2.545  0.014 
HELP AND INFORMATION  0.055***  2.920  0.014 
      
Tax System      
Overall Tax System Fairness   0.120***  3.725  0.03 
Fairness of the Tax System (Does not benefit the rich and is not 
unfair to the working man or woman)  0.099*** 5.365  0.024 
Tax Complexity  -0.026  -1.344  -0.007 
      
Perception regarding Tax Evasion      
Conditional Cooperation  -0.006***  -4.093  -0.001 
      
Awareness      
TALK WITH FAMILY  -0.116*  -1.913  -0.029 
TALK WITH FRIENDS  -0.307***  -4.909  -0.077 
RADIO INFORMATION   -0.015  -1.551  -0.004 
      
Trust and Obedience      
TRUST OFFICIALS   0.139***  4.446  0.035 
TRUST OTHERS  0.078**  2.266  0.02 
OBEDIENCE 0.097**  2.309  0.024 
Notes: Summary results of 13 regressions. N between 953 (conditional cooperation specification) and 1304 
(tax administration specifications). Significance levels: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01< p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 




Rules are like restrictions that reduce the individuals’ possibility set. When 
people pay taxes, they obey the laws with respect to rules.  Thus, one 
would predict that people with a higher rule obedience have a higher tax 
morale. Respondents in the TOS were confronted with the following 
question: 
 
The most important thing a child should learn is obedience and respect for 
authority (strongly agree =4, mildly agree=3, mildly disagree=2, strongly 
disagree=1). 
 
Table 5 shows that a higher obedience and respect for the authority leads 
to a significantly higher tax morale.  
 
 
IV. CONCLUSIONS  
 
First of all our intention was to verify the correlation between tax 
compliance and tax morale. A central question in the tax compliance 
literature is why so many people pay their taxes although fines and audit 
probability are low. One key determinant might be tax morale, the 
intrinsic motivation to pay taxes. With data from the TOS 1987 we have 
found a significant correlation between tax evasion and tax morale. To 
check the sensitivity of the results, we used over-deduction and under-
declaration of the income as dependent variable. Furthermore we used a 
broad variety of proxies to measure tax morale. In all cases, the 
coefficient was significant, controlling for a variety of factors.  
Furthermore, in the tax compliance literature tax morale is rarely 
discussed and mostly as a residual explanation without referring to 
factors that shape tax morale. Although the data from the TOS are not 
new, it offers almost the only possibility to study a large variety of tax 
context factors. We provide evidence on the impact of factors that shape 
tax morale. Positive attitudes towards tax authority and tax system  
 
 
significantly increase tax morale. On the other hand, complexity has not a 
significant effect on tax morale. The awareness of tax issues correlates 
with a lower tax morale. However, the coefficient was not significant in all 
the cases. Trust in public officials and other people on the contrary had a 
highly significant positive effect on tax morale. Finally, a higher sense of 
obedience leads to a higher tax morale.  
According to the results, tax morale seems to be a key determinant 
in enhancing tax compliance. There are a variety of policies beside 
coercion that help to increase tax morale and thus tax compliance. More 
empirical work is needed to better understand tax morale. Similar to this 
paper, most of the empirical insights in the tax compliance literature have 
been gained with data sets from the United States. It remains the 
question to which extent the empirical findings from the United States can 
be generalised. The lack of empirical evidence in the tax compliance 
literature integrating regions as Europe, Africa, Latin America and Asia has 
to be reduced in the future.  It could be hypothesised that the effects 
found in this paper with U.S. data might be similar for the European 
countries, as many institutional components are comparable to the United 
States. However, it would be interesting to check the robustness of these 
results in developing countries where noncompliance and tax morale seem 
to be real problems (Torgler 2003, Alm, Martinez-Vazquez and Torgler 
2007). In general, an excellent method would be to conduct panels or to 
do regular surveys in different countries, similarly designed as the TOS.  
In general, results and conclusions obtained in tax morale research 
are of considerable importance. First, it can provide insight in a more 
efficient way of raising revenues since the interaction between the 
taxpayer and the tax authority is taken into account. Second, this 
research points to a broader understanding of tax compliance where 
aspects of deterrence (audits and penalties), government regulation, 
opportunity costs (migration costs and employment status), the quality of 
publicly provided goods, the tax system (complexity, progressivity and 
incidence), treatment of taxpayers by the tax authority (transparency,  
 
 
partnership and generosity) and the homogeneity or heterogeneity of the 
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